



verichains

SECURITY AUDIT OF
CRYPTOPIECE SMART CONTRACT



Public Report

Dec 18, 2021

Verichains Lab

info@verichains.io

<https://www.verichains.io>

Driving Technology > Forward



ABBREVIATIONS

Name	Description
Ethereum	An open source platform based on blockchain technology to create and distribute smart contracts and decentralized applications.
Ether (ETH)	A cryptocurrency whose blockchain is generated by the Ethereum platform. Ether is used for payment of transactions and computing services in the Ethereum network.
Smart contract	A computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract.
Solidity	A contract-oriented, high-level language for implementing smart contracts for the Ethereum platform.
Solc	A compiler for Solidity.
ERC20	ERC20 (BEP20 in Binance Smart Chain or xRP20 in other chains) tokens are blockchain-based assets that have value and can be sent and received. The primary difference with the primary coin is that instead of running on their own blockchain, ERC20 tokens are issued on a network that supports smart contracts such as Ethereum or Binance Smart Chain.

Report for CryptoPiece

Security Audit – CryptoPiece Smart Contract

Version: 1.0 - Public Report

Date: Dec 18, 2021



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Security Audit Report prepared by Verichains Lab on Dec 18, 2021. We would like to thank the CryptoPiece for trusting Verichains Lab in auditing smart contracts. Delivering high-quality audits is always our top priority.

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of the CryptoPiece Smart Contract. The scope of the audit is limited to the source code files provided to Verichains. Verichains Lab completed the assessment using manual, static, and dynamic analysis techniques.

During the audit process, the audit team had identified no vulnerable issues in the smart contracts code.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY	5
1.1. About CryptoPiece Smart Contract	5
1.2. Audit scope	5
1.3. Audit methodology	5
1.4. Disclaimer	6
2. AUDIT RESULT	7
2.1. Overview	7
2.2. Contract codes	7
2.2.1. Belly token contract	7
2.3. Findings	7
2.4. Additional notes and recommendations	8
2.4.1. Useless code in constructor INFORMATIVE	8
2.4.2. Useless <code>_beforeTokenTransfer</code> internal function INFORMATIVE.....	8
2.4.3. The range of solidity version too wide and old INFORMATIVE.....	8
2.4.4. Redundant importing contracts INFORMATIVE	9
3. VERSION HISTORY	11

1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

1.1. About CryptoPiece Smart Contract

CryptoPiece is a NFT game that focuses on gamers, made by gamers and for gamers. We want to have our players not only feeling relax, enjoying their favorite game, but also earning at the same time. Through our unique play to earn system, players can gather their crew by recruiting mercenary through a Mercenary Contract in Merc Centre. They then can sail their ship and go on an exciting adventure. By capturing criminals in Wanted list by the Government, players can earn Belly – ingame currency – and level up their Merc.

Belly Token is an ERC20 token that Belly players can use in the game.

1.2. Audit scope

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of the smart contracts of Belly Token. It was conducted on commit [0f61bc1d3aa60d82826fa95989c2c37b9ce86f60](https://github.com/Cryptopiece/smartcontracts/tree/master/contracts/token) from git repository <https://github.com/Cryptopiece/smartcontracts/tree/master/contracts/token>.

1.3. Audit methodology

Our security audit process for smart contract includes two steps:

- Smart contract codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using public and RK87, our in-house smart contract security analysis tool.
- Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The contracts are manually analyzed to look for any potential problems.

Following is the list of commonly known vulnerabilities that was considered during the audit of the smart contract:

- Integer Overflow and Underflow
- Timestamp Dependence
- Race Conditions
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- DoS with (Unexpected) revert
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Gas Usage, Gas Limit and Loops
- Redundant fallback function
- Unsafe type Inference
- Reentrancy



- Explicit visibility of functions state variables (external, internal, private and public)
- Logic Flaws

For vulnerabilities, we categorize the findings into categories as listed in table below, depending on their severity level:

SEVERITY LEVEL	DESCRIPTION
CRITICAL	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning; creates a critical risk to the contract; required to be fixed immediately.
HIGH	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with high impact; needs to be fixed with high priority.
MEDIUM	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with medium impact in a specific scenario; needs to be fixed.
LOW	An issue that does not have a significant impact, can be considered as less important.

Table 1. Severity levels

1.4. Disclaimer

Please note that security auditing cannot uncover all existing vulnerabilities, and even an audit in which no vulnerabilities are found is not a guarantee for a 100% secure smart contract. However, auditing allows discovering vulnerabilities that were unobserved, overlooked during development and areas where additional security measures are necessary.

2. AUDIT RESULT

2.1. Overview

The initial review was conducted in Dec 2021 and a total effort of 3 working days was dedicated to identifying and documenting security issues in the code base of Belly Token.

2.2. Contract codes

The CryptoPiece Smart Contract was written in [Solidity](#) language, with the required version in the range from [0.8.0](#) to [0.8.9](#).

2.2.1. Belly token contract

The Belly token is an ERC20 token contract. The contract inherits [ERC20Burnable](#) contracts so the contracts have [burn](#) function which allows the users to [burn](#) their token and cause decreasing the totalSupply of the contract. In addition, the contract also inherits the [burnFrom](#) function. So an allowance account can call this function to remove the owner balances.

Table 2 lists some properties of the audited CryptoPiece Smart Contract (as of the report writing time).

PROPERTY	VALUE
Name	Belly
Symbol	Belly
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1,000,000,000 (x10 ¹⁸) Note: the number of decimals is 18, so the total representation token will be 1,000,000,000 or 1 billion.

Table 2. The CryptoPiece Smart Contract properties

2.3. Findings

During the audit process, the audit team found no vulnerability in the given version of CryptoPiece Smart Contract.

2.4. Additional notes and recommendations

2.4.1. Useless code in constructor **INFORMATIVE**

In the `constructor`, the `transferOwnership` statement for `msg.sender` is useless. Because the contract inherits `Ownable` which has done it in the `Ownable constructor`.

```
constructor() {  
    _mint(msg.sender, 1000000000*10**uint256(18));  
    transferOwnership(msg.sender);  
}
```

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest removing the `transferOwnership` statement.

UPDATES

- *Dec 18, 2021*: This issue has been acknowledged and fixed by the CryptoPiece team in commit [e6db4646d305b98ed665e21165602e0c681b6572](#). The statements was removed.

2.4.2. Useless `_beforeTokenTransfer` internal function **INFORMATIVE**

The contract overrides `_beforeTokenTransfer` internal function but it doesn't do anything except call the `_beforeTokenTransfer` parent function. It is useless.

```
function _beforeTokenTransfer(address from, address to, uint256 amount)  
internal override(ERC20) {  
    super._beforeTokenTransfer(from, to, amount);  
}
```

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest removing this function for readability.

UPDATES

- *Dec 18, 2021*: This issue has been acknowledged and fixed by the CryptoPiece team in commit [e6db4646d305b98ed665e21165602e0c681b6572](#). The function was removed.

2.4.3. The range of solidity version too wide and old **INFORMATIVE**

In the head of the source code, the file defines the version solidity that was used in the contract between `0.7.5` to `0.8.9`. We suggest changing the lower bound to `0.8.0`.

Report for CryptoPiece

Security Audit – CryptoPiece Smart Contract

Version: 1.0 - Public Report

Date: Dec 18, 2021



After setting the lower bound of the solidity version to [0.8.0](#). We suggest removing the [SafeMath](#) library from the contract and changing all methods of [SafeMath](#) to normal operators. Because all [SafeMath](#) usage in the contract is for overflow checking, solidity [0.8.0+](#) already do that by default, the only usage of [SafeMath](#) now is to have a custom revert message which isn't the case in the auditing contracts.

UPDATES

- *Dec 18,2021*: This issue has been acknowledged and fixed by the CryptoPiece team int commit [e6db4646d305b98ed665e21165602e0c681b6572](#).

2.4.4. Redundant importing contracts **INFORMATIVE**

In the head of the source code, the source code imported [ERC20Capped](#), [SafeERC20](#) and [ERC20](#) contract but they aren't used anywhere. We suggest removing these import statements for readability.

UPDATES

- *Dec 18,2021*: This issue has been acknowledged by the CryptoPiece team int commit [e6db4646d305b98ed665e21165602e0c681b6572](#).



APPENDIX




Image 1. CryptoPiece Smart Contract call graph

Report for CryptoPiece

Security Audit – CryptoPiece Smart Contract

Version: 1.0 - Public Report

Date: Dec 18, 2021



3. VERSION HISTORY

Version	Date	Status/Change	Created by
1.0	<i>Dec 18, 2020</i>	Public Report	Verichains Lab

Table 3. Report versions history